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What made the invitation to participate in the Writing Across the Mar-
gins symposium irresistible was not only the prospect of swapping tales
with fellow trespassers, but also the spirit of risk-taking that seems to have
animated the conference plan. Even the word "margins," which ordinarily
would connote more or less fixed bounds, becomes elastic in the lexicon of
Lash LaRue. "Come to Lexington," he said, "and talk about rhetoric or
authority in constitutional law; or about the difficulties or rewards of cross-
disciplinary or cross-national research; or any or all of the above."
That was an offer I could not refuse. I will confine myself to just one
aspect of the topic: the question of why anyone engages in interdisciplinary
or comparative legal studies given the formidable practical difficulties and
the high risk of error or failure.
I will be brief about the difficulties, for they are fairly obvious. The
major problem is that if cross-disciplinarians waited to know as much as we
feel we ought before writing, we could never put pen to paper. The same
may be said, of course, of any researcher in the natural or human sciences
because the horizon of human knowledge recedes as the mind approaches
it. But the risks of error, oversight, and misunderstanding increase expo-
nentially if one combines disciplines, legal systems, and languages.
Some might include on the list of disadvantages the risk of being
regarded by one's peers with indifference or a certain amount of suspicion.
Consider the pioneers of the new science of complexity, formerly known
as "chaos science." They are mathematicians, physicists, and biologists
who suffered considerable professional disadvantages in their respective
disciplines.' Because they strayed across the margins of several fields, they
were regarded as neither fish nor fowl. They were treated as outsiders for
many years by physics, math, and life science departments.
* Learned Hand Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Professor Glendon
delivered this address at the Writing Across the Margins symposium held at Washington and
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1. See JAMEs GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 37-38, 66 (1987).
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Fortunately, the field of law has been relatively hospitable to cross-
disciplinary work, in part because law students arrive with such varied
educational backgrounds and because so many lawyers have to be general-
ists. Lawyers have learned that what begins as trespass can become
possession if the poacher settles down and cultivates the area. And, as
property students know, the right sort of possession kept up for a suffi-
cient length of time may even end in ownership. The law and economics
movement, which was just getting started when I was a student at the
University of Chicago, affords a striking example of how scholars who
began by writing across the margins can ultimately rewrite the page and
relocate the margins.
Some interdisciplinary projects, however, remain outside the legal
mainstream. In the United States, for example, that has been the fate of
comparative law. American comparatists, in fact, often find that our
colleagues abroad welcome our enterprise more than our colleagues at
home. To many American lawyers, an interest in other legal systems is
something like an interest in wines: a little knowledge about them is a sign
of good taste and sophistication, but a serious dedication may be evidence
of waste, or luxury, or even worse.
Sometimes it is just old-fashioned chauvinism that causes American
lawyers to resist cross-national comparison. But more often their skeptical
attitudes reflect the same doubts that comparatists themselves entertain.
As the domestic legal environment becomes ever more complex and
specialized, it is hard enough to keep abreast of even one comer of our
own legal system. The more areas, systems, and approaches one tries to
cover, the more one becomes vulnerable to Judge Harry Edward's charge
of producing work that is neither useful to the legal community nor a
significant contribution to other fields of human knowledge.2 It is difficult
to deny that Judge Edwards has a point when he complains that: "Our law
reviews are now full of mediocre interdisciplinary articles. Too many law
professors are ivory tower dilettantes, pursuing whatever subject piques
their interest, whether or not the subject merits scholarship and whether
or not they have the scholarly skills to master it. 3
With comparative law, the difficulties escalate. We not only must
become familiar with the technical aspects of another legal system, but
we also have to assess how the law on the books actually operates in its
own social context. In other words, we must become comparative social
2. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992).
3. Id. at 36.
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scientists in the broadest sense. And often, we must learn another lan-
guage.
The harder we try to avoid the pitfalls identified by Judge Edwards,
the more likely we are to become mired in an even more intractable
problem: the field of human knowledge is vast and life, alas, is short. On
one side of our path, then, is the swamp of superficiality; on the other, the
lime-pit of limitless learning. The path itself is slippery, and we can
never see more than a few paces ahead.
Why, then, would anyone undertake comparative legal studies? For
most of the American comparatists of the previous generation, the answer
was easy: they had no choice. Nearly all of them were European-born
lawyers forced to emigrate and start over from scratch in the 1930s.1
Some, like my teacher Max Rheinstein, were already comparatists. The
majority, however, had comparison thrust upon them.
For most of the current generation, I venture to guess that the first
steps were not taken pursuant to any plan, but rather involved some casual
trespass that led to an "aha" experience - an experience so pleasurable
that we felt impelled to try to repeat it. A good example is David Currie,
who taught and wrote about American environmental and constitutional
law at the University of Chicago for many years before his dean, Gerhard
Casper, encouraged him to take a research leave in Freiburg. Currie was
attracted to the idea because he had always enjoyed studying languages.
I suppose he must have embarked on the experience as something of
a lark, a vacation from his magisterial history of the Constitution in the
United States Supreme Court.5 In Freiburg, he began looking into how
Germany was dealing with problems of pollution, and he made, as he put
it to me in a recent conversation, "a series of minor discoveries." They
seem to have affected him like eating peanuts. He turned to German
constitutional law, where he came upon the notion of "positive rights" -
the idea that the state must not only refrain from infringing certain rights,
but must affirmatively promote them, even to the point of setting condi-
tions for their effective exercise. 6 He describes his encounter with that
concept as "eye-opening" because it enabled him to notice aspects of
American constitutional law that he had never considered before.
4. See DER EINFLUss DEUTSCHER EMIGRANTEN AUF DIE RECHTSENTWICKLUNG IN
DEN USA UND IN DEUTSCHLAND 1-31 (Marcus Lutter et al. eds., 1993).
5. See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTON IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS (1985); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY (1990).
6. See generally David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U.
CHn. L. REv. 864 (1986).
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Out of Currie's margin-crossing came several important writings,
including an essay on positive and negative rights in American law7 and
a treatise in English on German constitutional law.' He has gone on to
learn Italian and is currently planning a book on Italian constitutional law.
What gets a scholar hooked on comparative legal studies, I believe,
are not the usual pragmatic justifications that can be given for cross-
national research.9 Whatever prompts one's original step across the
margins, what grips and holds people is one of the most powerful drives
known to the human species: the unrestricted desire to know. If hauled
up before Judge Edwards and charged with trespassing, the only honest
defense most comparatists could offer would be, "I couldn't help it."
I would like, therefore, to focus on the question whether there is
some reason why trespass should be especially productive of fertile in-
sights such as those that abound in the fine book on rhetoric in constitu-
tional law that we have gathered here to celebrate. That question falls
somewhere within psychology, philosophy, and history, but has received
relatively little attention from any of those disciplines. By insight, I mean
the "aha" experience - the major and minor flashes of understanding that
seemingly pop into one's mind out of nowhere. The classic instance is the
tale of Archimedes, who became discouraged while trying to devise a
method for measuring the proportion of gold in a crown. He betook
himself to the public baths, where, as legend has it, he was idly noting the
displacement of water by his body, when he had an idea so powerful that
he ran naked into the street shouting a "Eureka!" that has echoed through
the centuries. 10
Modem firsthand accounts of path-breaking discoveries suggest that
there may well be a connection between important insights like Archime-
des's and the crossing of boundaries. A common thread in these stories
is a complete inability (on the part of some of the most brilliant people
who have ever lived) to explain just how they initially reached the break-
through in question. It is significant that they characteristically insist the
insight was not achieved through long study, although long study does
7. Id.
8. See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY (1994).
9. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS
8-11 (2d ed. 1994) (describing typical pragmatic justifications given for cross-national
research).
10. See BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 3-6
(1958) (introducing his masterful study of how we know what we know with story of
Archimedes).
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seem to be a prerequisite. As Louis Pasteur put it, "Fortune favors the
prepared mind.""
A typical account is that given by the mathematician Karl Friedrich
Gauss to a friend of how he finally found the solution to a problem with
which he had been struggling for four years. "At last," wrote Gauss, "I
succeeded, not by dint of painful effort but so to speak by the grace of
God. As a sudden flash of light, the enigma was solved .... For my
part I am unable to name the nature of the thread which connected what
I previously knew with that which made my success possible." 2
It is noteworthy that Gauss and others have stressed that their break-
throughs did not emerge from logical and systematic processes of induc-
tion or deduction. In fact, it was only some time later that Gauss logically
worked out the proof to validate his discovery. The sequence of proof
following discovery is easy to overlook because when we read about the
solution of a mathematical or scientific problem in a textbook, the order
is always reversed: we are shown the proof as though it had led to the
solution.
Students of cognitive theory (philosophers and psychologists writing
across the margins of their disciplines) situate such episodes within the
dynamic structure of human knowing: the cumulative processes through
which all of us attend to the world around us, reflect on our experiences,
get ideas about them, and use reason to sort the good ideas from the
duds.' 3 That recurrent process of experiencing, understanding, and
evaluating regularly generates insights - not only great ideas on rare
occasions in the minds of geniuses, but also little bright ideas in the minds
of all of us every day.
In the recurrent mental operations that we collectively refer to as
"knowing," the insight part is the most mysterious. If it is not the crown-
ing step in a chain of logical reasoning and if it requires preparation - but
preparation alone cannot make it happen - where does it come from?
What makes insight more or less likely? What triggers insights of high
quality, the kind that stand up to logical scrutiny and open new vistas?
Some who have speculated about these questions suggest that there
are conditions that affect the frequency and quality of creative mental
activity in individuals and in groups. The science historian Thomas Kuhn
11. Quoted in ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE ACT OF CREATION: A STUDY OF THE CON-
SCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES OF HUMOR, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, AND ART 113
(1964).
12. Quoted in id. at 117.
13. See generally LONERGAN, supra note 10.
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contends that significant advances in the natural sciences have generally
been made by people who combine two qualities that do not always sit
easily with one another: mastery of the normal science of their times, plus
the boldness to break with the intellectual framework within which that
normal science takes place.14 A classic example is Charles Darwin, who
was fully immersed in the biological science of his day before he got the
ideas that utterly transformed it.
Arthur Koestler's studies of artistic and scientific creativity point to
another condition that seems closely associated with the kinds of insights
that change the way we understand the world. Koestler noticed that
transformative breakthroughs have often been sparked by what he called
"bisociation."' 5 Bisociation was his name for what happens when two or
more well-developed but relatively autonomous matrices of thought and
experience come into contact.16 Such encounters across disciplinary or
cultural boundaries, according to Koestler, seem to trigger a fertile pro-
cess of uncovering, selecting, reshuffling, combining, and synthesizing
data, ideas, and skills.17
What do those descriptions of great moments of intellectual history
have to do with our homely discipline of law? They are like a photo-
graphic enlargement of the same mental operations that take place in the
minds of all of us from infancy onward. The insights of a lawyer or a
toddler may be less momentous than those of a Gauss, but the process is
the same.
A few years ago I came across a passage in an essay by a French
historian that comes as close as anything I have seen to specifying the kind
of "aha" that legal comparatists regularly experience. Fernand Braudel
put it this way: "Live in England for a year and you will not learn much
about the English. But when you return to France you will see, in the
light of your surprise, that which had remained hidden to you because it
was so familiar." '8
That is precisely what happened to David Currie when he went to
Freiburg. And that is what kept great comparatists like Max Rheinstein
and John P. Dawson enthusiastic and productive right up to the end of
14. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC
TRADITION AND CHANGE 225-39 (1977).
15. See generally KOESTLER, supra note 11.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 108-09, 120; see also GLEICK, supra note 1, at 37.
18. FERNAND BRAUDEL, HISTOIRE ET SCIENCES SOCIALE: LA LONGUE DURE,
ANNALES: ECONOMIES, SOCI9TIS, CIVILISATIONS 725, 737 (1958).
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their lives. There is something compelling about the experience of seeing
something about our own legal system "in the light of [our] surprise,"
something that would probably have remained invisible to us without the
perspective from another country, or culture, or from other disciplines
such as literature, history, and economics. Then, as we reason about and
critically evaluate what we have seen, we are off to the races: the re-
current steps in the dynamic, cumulative processes of human knowing.
Those processes of experiencing, understanding, reasoning, and judging,
in turn, lead to cognitive restructuring, higher viewpoints, and fresh in-
sights. And so it goes.
Like Currie, I stumbled into comparative law through language: Max
Rheinstein recruited me for the University of Chicago's Foreign Law
Program because of my schoolbook French. When I became a law pro-
fessor, it seemed natural to me, when dealing with the problems our legal
system does not handle very well, to look around to see how those prob-
lems were dealt with in the legal systems of other liberal democracies. I
began to realize, through comparative constitutional studies, that the post-
World War II language of human rights, like other languages, is spoken
in different dialects. That realization led to the recognition that our Amer-
ican form of rights talk is quite distinctive. 19 It differs in significant
respects from the discourse embodied in the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and in many continental European legal
systems. That realization, in turn, led me into problems of cultural and
legal hermeneutics that other panelists here have approached from differ-
ent interdisciplinary routes. More recently, it has drawn me into the study
of the migration of legal ideas, of legal syncretism, and of the way in
which differing rights ideas can merge with, colonize, displace, or be
displaced by one another.
To return now to the question I posed at the outset: Can one say any
more about the conditions that promote fertile ideas? This is not just
a matter of interest to scholars. When longtime practicing lawyers are
asked what qualities they value in an associate, they often say that the
pearl beyond price is the associate who, in addition to possessing all the
usual legal skills, is regularly able to come up with problem-solving ideas.
But good ideas cannot be produced on demand. Nor can we do much
to upgrade the mental equipment we received at birth. We can, however,
cultivate the "prepared mind" of which Pasteur spoke;2" we can be atten-
19. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: TH IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 12 (1991).
20. See KOESTLER, supra note 11.
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tive to experience and we can develop our reasoning skills. Beyond that,
cognitive theory suggests that confrontation or comparison of different
spheres of meaning increases the probability of insights and opens up
previously unrecognized avenues of inquiry.2' Legal sociologist Gunther
Teubner refers to such encounters as "shocks" that promote transformative
restructuring by shaking up the categories within which we habitually
work.' But "triggers" and "shocks" are metaphors, not explanations.
Perhaps the most one can say is that "bisociation" seems to work even
though we do not know why or how.
Let me now return to two points I mentioned earlier: the fact that
most bright ideas are duds and the fact that most paradigm-transforming
achievements have not been produced by rebels who scorned the work of
their predecessors, but by innovators who respected and mastered a tradi-
tion. Think here not only of Darwin, but Picasso, Stravinsky, or T.S.
Eliot. For those of us who labor at less exalted levels, does that not
condemn us to the slippery slope of superficiality or the hopelessly long
march toward the book we will never be quite ready to write?
In facing that dilemma, legal scholars might do well to ponder
Thomas Kuhn's observation that, more often than not, it is the community
of specialized knowers, rather than any single individual, that possesses
the requisite combination of a rigorous grounding in tradition with an
innovative spirit.' When both qualities are well-represented in the profes-
sional mix and when both traditionalists and innovators are well-grounded
in normal science, you have what Kuhn calls the "essential tension" that
promotes creativity.u The tension benefits the entire group by pulling all
of its members in both directions.' The stage is then set for collective
achievements like quantum theory, or the American Founding, or at a
more modest level, law and economics.
Kuhn's observations are especially pertinent to a field like compara-
tive law. European comparative law institutes have tackled the problem
of amassing the requisite languages and technical legal knowledge by
fostering scholarly collaboration. Thirty years of collaborative effort on
the International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law under the direction of
Ulrich Drobnig at Hamburg's Max Planck Institute for Foreign and
21. See LONERGAN, supra note 10, at 626 (discussing shock effect of humor).
22. See Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13
CARDOZO L. REv. 1443, 1453-56 (1992).
23. See KUHN, supra note 14, at 227-28.
24. Id. at 225.
25. Id. at 234.
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International Law provide eloquent testimony both to the difficulties and
rewards of teamwork.
In light of Thomas Kuhn's research, however, I cannot help wonder-
ing about the implications for our own legal system when so many Ameri-
can legal scholars currently are disdainful of our own equivalent of normal
science, namely, the study and practice of law. The American legal
academy seems to be well-supplied with iconoclasts, but these daring
individuals often have a shallow understanding of their own legal tradi-
tions and of the nuts and bolts of the legal system. A related concern is
that so many legal scholars work in relative isolation and, as a result, lose
the benefits that can attend more self-consciously collaborative enterprises.
On the other hand, one need not find one's intellectual companions
in one's own discipline, or one's own nation-state, or even in one's own
time. In fact, the most moving account of reaching across margins that
I have ever seen is about friendship with the dead. I would like to close,
therefore, with a few lines from a letter by a thinker who initiated a great
transformation in political philosophy. He had just been released from
prison and was keeping, as we would say, a low profile, working outdoors
on his estate, with few opportunities for intelligent conversation. In the
evenings, however, he writes:
I return to my house and go into my study. At the door I take off
my clothes of the day, covered with mud and mire, and I put on my
regal and courtly garments; and decently reclothed, I enter the ancient
courts of ancient men, where, received by them lovingly, I feed on the
food that alone is mine and that I was born for. There I am not ashamed
to speak with them and to ask them the reasons for their actions; and
they in their humanity reply to me. And for the space of four hours I
feel no boredom, I forget every pain, I do not fear poverty, death does
not frighten me. I deliver myself entirely to them.26
The letter is dated December 10, 1513. The writer was that tradition-
haunted paradigm-breaker, Niccolb Machiavelli.
It is worth recalling that Machiavelli would not have located himself
within the then-unknown discipline of political science any more than
Adam Smith would have called himself an economist. The freedom they
enjoyed to roam from one field to another has been lost to us with the
increasing fragmentation and specialization of the human sciences. From
that perspective, we can view writing across margins as an act of faith in
the unity of knowledge. In that sense, we who cross borders are not
26. Letter from Niccolb Machiavelli to Francesco Vettori (Dec. 10, 1513), in
NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE app. at 107-08 (Harvey C. Mansfield trans., 1985).
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trespassers at all. We are more like voyagers drawn by the eros of the
mind toward the destination for which we were born. Even if, like
Moses, we cannot enter that promised land, we can approach it, and
perhaps glimpse it from afar.27
27. Deuteronomy 34:4-5.
